The literature on electoral violence claims that polling on election day is often the most peaceful period in the electoral process, a finding researchers consider paradoxical and surprising. This paper argues that the peacefulness of polling relative to other parts of the electoral process can be linked to the increasing international interest in elections as exemplified by the rise of international election monitoring. The presence of international electoral missions is expected to mitigate the potential for election-day violence because domestic actors likely refrain from intimidating opposition candidates or voters before the eyes of international observers. However, the presence of international observers creates incentives for political actors to engage in violent manipulation in parts of the electoral process receiving considerably less international attention, such as the preelection period. The paper therefore expects that international election observation increases the incidence of violent manipulation during electoral campaigns. An empirical analysis of election-related violence for African elections in the 1990-2009 period supports the theoretical arguments. Robustness tests show that the findings are robust to a number of model specifications.
Introduction
In the first parliamentary elections in Egypt since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, commentators observed that election day was surprisingly peaceful after a campaign period marred by substantial violence. 1 The small but growing literature on electoral violence also notes that election day, even when preceded by violence, is often surprisingly peaceful. For example, Laakso (2007: 228) observes that "quite paradoxically the actual polling, which is the most keenly monitored phase of the elections, is often the most peaceful period." Similarly, Höglund (2009: 416) remarks that "the day of the election is often remarkably peaceful." Conceptualizing violence before and during the voting as a form of manipulation, this paper suggests that relatively lower levels of violence on election day are a response to increased attention to electoral processes, particularly election day. International organizations engaged in election monitoring have successfully documented and criticized fraudulent elections, and such fraud has resulted in domestic and international punishments (Tucker, 2007) . To avoid negative publicity and punishment, domestic elites strategically shift violent intimidation to the pre-election period in internationally monitored elections, resulting in increased violent manipulation before elections but relatively lower levels of violence on election day.
The paper makes important contributions to the literatures on electoral violence and strategic manipulation. First, the paper develops an argument that emphasizes the effect of international actors on violence before and during elections and systematically evaluates these expectations in a set of African elections. The study of elections and violence, particularly violence that occurs before or during the actual polling, lacks systematic analyses and existing small-N studies have mostly emphasized the importance of domestic factors such as the competitiveness of elections (Wilkinson, 2004; Chaturvedi, 2005; Collier & Vicente, 2012) . The central proposition developed and evaluated here is that in elections monitored by international observers, incumbents shift violent intimidation to the pre-election period to avoid international criticism and possible punishments. An empirical analysis of African elections in the [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] period confirms that monitored elections have a greater risk of violence in the pre-election period, thus demonstrating the importance of international factors in the occurrence of preelection violence.
Second, by examining whether international monitors can displace more direct forms of fraud such as violent intimidation, the paper adds to existing research on strategic manipulation that has focused primarily on less verifiable forms of manipulation (Hyde & O'Mahoney, 2010; Simpser & Donno, 2012) . The empirical findings show that the presence of monitors can increase the incidence of more direct forms of manipulation in the pre-election period. Moreover, since violent intimidation is a form of manipulation that can occur before but also during the polling, the paper can examine whether the presence of international monitors deters the incidence of violent manipulation on election day rather than implicitly assuming that such deterrent effects exist. While the empirical analysis does not show a direct relationship between international observers and election-day violence, the analysis confirms that the presence of monitors increases the incidence of violence before elections relative to violence on election day.
The paper proceeds as follows. I briefly review the literatures on electoral violence and strategic manipulation. The next section develops expectations on the effect of international monitoring on pre-election and election-day violence. Empirical findings for African elections held from 1990-2009 support the main hypotheses.
Violence as Manipulation
The relationship between elections and violence has only recently started to be examined systematically. The fact that electoral violence can occur before, during, or after elections creates difficulties for developing appropriate research designs. In addition, the causes of election violence may differ depending on when it occurs. Violence that takes place before elections or on election day is frequently an attempt to influence election outcomes and could thus be conceptualized as a form of election fraud, whereas violence that occurs after elections might be a response to outcomes, particularly if fraud occurred (Sisk, 2008; Höglund, 2009) . Likely for this reason, most research focuses on either pre-or post-election violence, with the majority of systematic research investigating the effect of elections on violence in the post-election period.
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Recent work has examined the effect of post-conflict elections on civil war recurrence (Brancati & Snyder, 2012; Flores & Nooruddin, 2012) , whether the incidence of election fraud increases the likelihood of protests and violence after elections (Tucker, 2007; Daxecker, 2012) , the impact of institutional factors on post-election civil conflict (Cheibub, Hays, & Savun, 2012) , and the relationship between elections, ethnic group exclusion, and ethnic civil war (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2012) .
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Compared to post-election violence, the causes and consequences of pre-election or election-day violence are poorly understood. Much of the research on this subject is either descriptive in nature or limited to a small number of countries, but generally supports the notion that electoral violence occurring before or during elections is usually designed to influence election outcomes by intimidating voters (Wilkinson, 2004; Chaturvedi, 2005; Laakso, 2007;  2 Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski (2012) and Goldstein et al. (2012) examine violence that occurs before, during, and after elections, but this could be problematic if violent manipulation occurring before elections triggers violent responses to outcomes thereafter. 3 With some exceptions, much of this research evaluates the relationship between elections and large-scale violence such as civil war, which likely omits incidents of election violence that did not pass the necessary severity threshold. Bratton, 2008; Höglund, 2009; Collier & Vicente, 2012 While the role of international actors has not been evaluated with regard to violent intimidation, research on other forms of electoral manipulation has documented that the presence of international election observers creates incentives for elites to engage in fraudulent behavior in the pre-election period (Simpser & Donno, 2012 , Hyde & O'Mahoney, 2010 Existing work on strategic manipulation has thus focused on how the presence of international election observers induces changes from more to less-verifiable forms of fraud. Yet the possibility that international observers could also displace more direct types of election fraud such as violent intimidation remains unexplored in the literature. While I do not dispute that monitoring could produce changes in the types of fraud used, the key issue seems to be not so much whether fraud is verifiable, but rather whether fraud will be observed and documented by international monitors. Since international actors focus most of their attention on election-day, domestic actors might simply shift fraudulent methods to periods when they may go undetected 6 Not all researchers agree that a desire to stay in power is the primary incentive for engaging in election fraud. Simpser (2008) , for example, argues that manipulation can be used to signal the strength of incumbents and their rivals, which explains manipulation by actors whose victory is certain. Regardless of whether election fraud is used to winning elections or transmitting information about parties' strength, I expect that domestic actors are less likely to engage in fraud in situations where punishment is likely. 7 Rather than directly observing increased manipulation in monitored elections, the authors examine the relationship between monitors and declines in governance that occur as a consequence of pre-election manipulation.
or receive little attention, rather than invest in costly and less certain methods. 
International Observers and Incentives for Violent Manipulation
The main proposition put forward in this paper is that the presence of international observers increases the likelihood of violent intimidation in the pre-election period. I expect that in elections under intense international scrutiny, such as those observed by credible international observers, violent manipulation is displaced to the campaign period. 10 The presence of international monitors makes it more difficult for the domestic actors to perpetrate violence (and others forms of verifiable fraud) on election day, thus placing constraints on the use of fraud by domestic actors. On election day, dozens or hundreds of short-term observer teams visit multiple polling stations to document instances of fraud, and incumbents and opposition actors will avoid being caught in front of international observers. Empirical research on international election monitoring has demonstrated the observers' ability to document fraud (Kelley, 2008 (Kelley, , 2012 Hyde, 2011) . Moreover, the detection of election fraud, especially blatant forms of fraud such as violence, can result in punishment by international and domestic actors. Research has shown that fraudulent elections, particularly when such fraud is documented by international observers, increase the likelihood of post-election protests and violence (Tucker, 2007 , Hyde & Marinov, 2008 Daxecker, 2012) . In addition to domestic punishments, research shows that international actors have reduced international benefits or imposed other punishments such as shaming, mediation, or sanctions in response to highly fraudulent elections (Hyde & O'Mahoney, 2010; Donno, 2010) . Consequently, domestic actors will refrain from using violent manipulation when international observers are present, but the negative consequences of electoral manipulation are less likely to occur when intimidation is used before international actors shift their attention to the election, such as the campaign period.
Violence in the pre-election period is less likely to be detected or, at a minimum, less likely to be criticized as strongly by international actors supervising the electoral process.
Practitioners and scholars frequently lament the international community's overwhelming emphasis on election day (Carothers, 1997 , Hyde & Kelley, 2011 . As Carothers (1997) points out, monitors typically observe only a small portion of the electoral process, but pay much less observers usually require several months to prepare for monitoring missions and are thus invited many months before elections, it seems reasonable to assume that domestic actors have sufficient time to adapt their manipulation strategies (Hyde, 2011). attention to the pre-election period. More importantly, even missions observing the entire electoral process "tend to base their postelection statements primarily on election-day events" (Carothers, 1997: 21) . Similarly, Hyde & Kelley (2011:3) argue that many groups continue to "arrive too late or are too understaffed to evaluate the full pre-election period and document whether there were problems." Several credible observer organizations now deploy long-term observers who observe the electoral process months before the elections, but given the small number of these observers, it is more difficult for them to document all instances of violent intimidation. Moreover, even when long-term monitors observe violent incidents in the preelection period, it is easier for domestic actors to disguise the responsibility for such incidents in the run-up to elections than on election day. What this overwhelming attention on election-day fraud suggests is that international monitors should increase the likelihood of more direct forms of fraud -not only less verifiable forms -that are available in the pre-election period. to the election, an African National Congress (ANC) official, the chairman of the ANC youth league, and the leader of an opposition party were killed, and several election rallies turned violent, resulting in injuries and deaths. 13 While the EISA report notes some of these violent incidents, it portrays them as isolated cases and emphasizes the peacefulness and credibility of elections in the executive summary and overall conclusion of the report. While arguably anecdotal, this account suggests that overwhelming emphasis continues to be placed on irregularities that occur on or after election day, suggesting that domestic elites can successfully shift violent intimidation to the pre-election period.
H1: The presence of credible international observer organizations increases the likelihood of election-related violence in the pre-election period.
The above discussion implies that the presence of international observers should make it more difficult to use blatant forms of fraud on election day since such fraud would likely be documented by observers and could result in punishments. While existing research has not systematically evaluated the effect of international scrutiny on electoral violence, Laakso (2007) and Höglund (2009) note that election day, while the most heavily monitored part of the electoral process, often appears to be the least violent one. While this intuition suggests that international monitors reduce the incidence of election-day violence, there are reasons to believe that the empirical relationship is more complex. First, it is possible that domestic elites increase preelection violence in response to the presence of monitors, but decide to continue using violence on election-day because fears of losing remain and outweigh the cost of possible punishments for committing fraud. Elites that remain sufficiently concerned about their chances of winning could thus continue to use violence on election-day even if it means international criticism. Second, it is possible that elites shift manipulative strategies geographically in addition to adjusting them temporally. Hyde's analysis of Armenia (2007) 
H2: The presence of credible international observer organizations has no effect on the likelihood of election-related violence on election day.
In addition to international observers' effect on absolute levels of violence, the above argument has implications for the relative occurrence of violence and suggests that the presence of monitors increases the occurrence of pre-election violence relative to the incidence of violence on election day. It is possible that some countries have generally higher levels of electoral violence, in which case a comparison of violent incidents in absolute terms could be misleading.
For example, election violence is more common in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Guyana, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Philippines and while such countries may still experience some violence on election-day even when monitors are present, the number of violent events on election-day should be lower relative to the incidence of violence in the pre-election period. Examining the effect of monitors on the relative incidence of violence before and during elections may thus more accurately capture the nature of the theoretical argument. Lindgren, & Padskocimaite, 2010) . SCAD has three advantages over these alternative sources. First, SCAD codes information on the issues involved in each event, allowing me to include only violent events relating to elections. Second, unlike the UCDP data, SCAD includes information on violent events that did not result in fatalities. Since violent intimidation implies physical harm or injury, but not necessarily death, it is preferable to use SCAD to operationalize violent intimidation. Third, SCAD codes the initiator for each conflict event, allowing me to distinguish between violence perpetrated by the government and violence committed by nonstate actors. 20 SCAD identifies up to three issues for each event. In addition to including all events in which elections were listed as an issue at stake, I also reviewed the event descriptions for events related to democracy, pro-government, or unknown issues to make sure that no election-related violent events were left out. This process produced several additional events that were clearly election-related and they were therefore included in the creation of the dependent variables.
related violent events committed by governmental and nonstate actors. Since violent intimidation is a form of fraud available to both government and opposition actors (Birch, 2012) Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the United Nations (UN).
23
The theoretical argument expects that the threat of negative publicity and punishments for blatant manipulation on election day creates incentives for strategic manipulation, which is why it is important to note that all of the organizations included have criticized fraudulent elections in the past. Organizations such as the African Union (AU) or the Economic Organization of West 22 One problem with creating separate measures for pre-election and election-day violence is that the unit of analysis in SCAD is the event, not the event-day, meaning that some events last several days or even weeks. While the vast majority of events start and end on the same day, a few violent events start before election-day but continue throughout it, thus creating coding problems. I code such cases as separate events for the pre-election and electionday variables, but an alternative approach would be to convert SCAD events into event-days (although this procedure might exaggerate the influence of some conflict events). 23 The focus on credible missions is similar to Kelley (2012) and Simpser & Donno (2012) . Reports by the listed organizations were consulted for each election round to verify whether they deployed a monitoring mission.
African States (ECOWAS), which are considered less willing or able to criticize elections, are therefore excluded. Empirically, 28.5 percent of election rounds in the data were monitored by one or more credible mission.
I include several additional variables to control for additional factors that could influence the occurrence of election monitoring and electoral violence. The first control variable accounts for the competitiveness of elections, an explanation for pre-election violence frequently emphasized in the literature (Chaturvedi, 2005; Collier & Vicente, 2012; Wilkinson, 2004 here since these effects would suggest that observed elections experience more fraud (including violent manipulation) throughout the entire electoral process rather than only in the pre-election period. Nevertheless, I use coarsened exact matching to reduce the risk of such bias and match on variables that are likely to influence observer anticipation of election fraud (Iacus, King & Porro, 2012) . Drawing on research on the likelihood of whether an election will be observed or not, I expect that observers may more frequently observe elections that experienced fraud in the preceding election-round, that were observed by international monitors in the past, or that occurred in countries with low levels of democracy (Hyde, 2011; Kelley, 2012) . The data are preprocessed using the previous fraud and democracy variables and a new variable coded 1 if elections were observed by a credible mission in the past. 33 Matching preprocesses the data and excludes observations from the treatment group (i.e. observed elections) and control group (i.e.
unobserved elections) that differ fundamentally on covariate values and thus might be driven by the absence or presence of observers. In sum, matching creates a sample in which observations that could be correlated with the presence of monitors are pruned from the data.
Results
The first model in table 1 provides support for the first hypothesis. The coefficient for the international observer variable is positive and significant at the 95 percent confidence level. In substantive terms, the probability of violence increases by 174 percent when the international observer variable is varied from 0 to 1. As expected, elections in which international monitors observed TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE the electoral process have an increased risk of violence in the three months prior to elections.
The evidence thus supports the notion that domestic actors strategically adapt their use of electoral manipulation. Results for control variables are mostly in line with expectations.
Elections with a previous history of fraud are at a greater risk of pre-election violence. In addition, the coefficient for the margin of victory variable is negative and significant, indicating that larger winning margins in previous elections decrease the risk of violence before elections.
Elections in which the margin of victory is expected to be decisive are thus less likely to experience pre-election violence, which supports the emphasis on the competitiveness of elections in the literature on election violence. Finally, increases in population size and ethnic fractionalization result in more pre-election violence. No significant effect is found for the GDP, democracy, and stability variables. Substantive effects for all three models in table 1 are   presented in table 2.   TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE The second model evaluates the effect of international monitors on election day violence.
The coefficient for the observer variable is negative but not statistically significant, thus supporting the second hypothesis. As discussed above, it is likely that violent intimidation that precedes elections by weeks or months is less effective in coercing candidates or voters than violence that occurs immediately surrounding elections, which would explain why no direct empirical relationship between international monitoring and election-day violence exists.
Alternatively, geographic displacement of fraud may occur in addition to temporal displacement, thus counteracting that deterrent effect of international monitoring on election-day manipulation (Ichino & Schündeln, 2012) . Results for control variables in model 2 show no significant relationship between fraud and election-day violence and margins of victory and election-day violence respectively. The only significant variables in model 2 are the democracy and population size variables. The negative and significant coefficient (albeit only at the 90 percent confidence level) for the democracy variable shows that more democratic states are less likely to experience election-day violence. Results for population size are similar to the first model.
The final model presented in table 1 evaluates the effect of covariates on the relative incidence of pre-election versus election-day violent events. The coefficient for the international observer variable is positive and significant at the 95% confidence level, which suggests that the presence of monitors increases the probability of pre-election violence relative to violence that occurs on election-day. Evidence presented in model 3 thus supports the third hypothesis.
Robustness Tests
I conduct several additional robustness tests to ensure that the above results are not influenced by the measurement of dependent and independent variables and the estimation methods employed. The first set of robustness tests presents the same models as in (Hyde, 2007) .
Since SCAD provides information on the perpetrators involved, I create separate dependent variables for election-related violent incidents initiated by state and nonstate actors, respectively.
Models 1 and 2 show that the main theoretical contention is confirmed for both state and nonstate actors as indicated in the positive and significant coefficients for the observer variables, although the coefficient is only significant at the 90 percent confidence level for violent events committed by nonstate actors. would not anticipate an effect of observers on violence that could not be conceptualized as a form of electoral manipulation. This finding also addresses a possible alternative explanation for a relationship between international election monitoring and pre-election violence. Kelley (2009 Kelley ( , 2012 shows that international observers are more likely to endorse elections preceded by violence because of concerns over escalating levels of violence and further destabilizing the situation. While her research does not explore the determinants of violence, her findings imply that domestic actors could strategically use pre-election violence to benefit from observers'
willingness to assess such elections more leniently rather than the theoretical explanation put forward here. Yet Kelley (2012: 187) argues that all instances of violence -regardless of whether related to elections or not -result in more positive assessments by international observers and includes all violence before elections in her empirical test. Hence, her argument would suggest a positive and significant relationship between international observers and all 35 As noted earlier, a few events in which the issue at stake was coded as democracy, pro-government, and unknown actually revealed a relation to elections in the brief issue description and these events were included in the variable on election-related violence.
types of pre-election violent events rather than only election-related violence. 36 Since empirical results show that monitors affect the occurrence of election-related violence but not other violent events, they seem more supportive of the theoretical explanation developed in this paper.
The last three models explore whether the effect of international monitoring and violent manipulation holds for international observer missions that pay more attention to the pre-election phase by deploying long-term observers (LTOs). In such missions, observers arrive weeks or months prior to the election and should thus be more capable of detecting and criticizing violence in the pre-election period. Yet as discussed earlier, even missions that deploy LTOs cannot dedicate the same amount of attention to the pre-election period because the number of LTOs is much smaller than the contingent of observers deployed on election day. Moreover, having separate groups of observers for different parts of the electoral process can create difficulties in integrating the observations of long-and short-term observers, which could prevent sufficient attention to pre-election problems in organizations' final reports or post-election statements. Election-day observers may feel primarily responsible for commenting on what happens on election day and thus "consciously or subconsciously discount earlier problems" (Bjornlund, 2004: 146) While the policy implications of this research may appear controversial, it is important to note that the effect of international monitors on pre-election violence is weakened for observer missions that pay greater attention to the pre-election period, although this effect holds only for violence committed by nonstate actors. The findings nevertheless support the frequent call for greater supervision of all parts of the electoral process, and it is possible that improvements in the quality and numbers of long-term observers will succeed in deterring the use of pre-election intimidation by state actors (Hyde & Kelley, 2011) . A final caveat is necessary. As with any study focusing on a particular region, it is not clear whether the empirical findings apply outside the African context. 
